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We report a case of ocular vaccinia infection in an
unvaccinated laboratory worker. The patient was infected
by a unique strain used in an experiment performed partly
outside a biosafety cabinet. Vaccination should continue to
be recommended, but laboratories with unvaccinated
workers should also implement more stringent biosafety
practices.
V
accinia virus, the orthopoxvirus used in smallpox vac-
cine, is increasingly used in research laboratories,
both to investigate orthopoxvirus biology and as a tool in
molecular biology and immunology (1–4). Vaccinia can
cause mild-to-moderate infection in healthy hosts and can
be transmitted to their contacts (3,5–8). Although routine
smallpox vaccination has been discontinued in the United
States since 1971, vaccination is still recommended for
healthcare and laboratory workers who handle nonattenu-
ated orthopoxviruses (6). We document ocular vaccinia
infection in an unvaccinated laboratory worker and
describe the associated laboratory and epidemiologic
investigation.
Case Report
An immunology graduate student born after the discon-
tinuation of routine smallpox vaccination was working
with multiple strains of vaccinia as part of her thesis
research. She had voluntarily declined vaccination before
beginning laboratory work with vaccinia. One morning in
October 2004, she noticed the onset of itching, tearing,
palpebral swelling, and conjunctival injection in her left
eye. Viral conjunctivitis was diagnosed by her student
health services, and over-the-counter tetrahydrozoline
hydrochloride eye drops were prescribed. During the next
4 days, the eye became swollen, red, and painful; malaise,
fatigue, and subjective fever also appeared. On day 5 the
patient went to a private ophthalmologist, who referred her
to a specialty eye hospital.
Physical examination at the eye hospital demonstrated
a painful left eye with 3+ chemosis in the eyelids and con-
junctiva and symblepharon at the lower pole of the eye. A
0.5-cm vesicle was noted above the left canthus (Figure 1).
Left ocular range of motion, including palpebral motion,
was severely limited. Keratitis was not evident. Routine
laboratory values were normal. Computed tomographic
scan of the orbits indicated left preseptal cellulitis without
evidence of orbital cellulitis. The diagnosis of vaccinia
infection was not suspected until examination at the eye
hospital, when the student first mentioned her work with
vaccinia. Contact precautions were then initiated, and a
scraping of the vesicle above the canthus was sent to the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Laboratories for vaccinia testing.
The patient was started on trifluridine and bacitracin oint-
ments, broad-spectrum systemic antimicrobial agents, and
pain medication; she was admitted to the hospital.
During the next 48 hours, additional vesicles appeared
on the lower conjunctiva (Figure 2), and periorbital
swelling increased. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test-
ing at the Pennsylvania Bureau of Laboratories showed
evidence of vaccinia; results were confirmed at the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). At this time,
vaccinia immune globulin (VIG), 6,000 U/kg IV, was
administered. Less than 24 hours after VIG administration,
the patient’s pain and swelling were substantially
decreased. The patient continued to improve over the next
2 days and was discharged to her home on day 9. No long-
term sequelae occurred, although recovery took several
weeks.
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Figure 1. Patient's left eye after admission to hospital. The primary
pox lesion is located at the inner canthus. Photographer: E. Claire
Newbern.A public health investigation of the patient’s home and
work contacts and the research laboratory was initiated.
Because cutaneous lesions from vaccinia typically appear
3–5 days after inoculation (5), investigators postulated that
the patient contracted her infection within the 7 days
before symptom onset. The patient was considered infec-
tious from the beginning of this period until hospitalization
(11 days). During this time, she had 3 household contacts
and 11 work contacts. Household contacts were monitored
for signs of illness for 1 week. All contacts were inter-
viewed with a standard questionnaire to ascertain the
extent of their contact with the patient, vaccination status,
and information about laboratory work practices, if appli-
cable. Acute- and convalescent-phase paired serum sam-
ples were drawn at 1 and 6 weeks after exposure from all
work contacts, as well as from the patient’s closest home
contact. Convalescent-phase serum was drawn from the
patient at week 6. Paired serum samples from the patient’s
consenting contacts were examined for evidence of
orthopoxvirus-reactive antibody by using techniques
described elsewhere (9). Serologic results are summarized
in the Table. 
A laboratory inspection, which included a review of
experiments performed by the patient during the week
before symptom onset, was conducted, Although laborato-
ry staff generally followed established biosafety precau-
tions (10), review of laboratory practices showed several
opportunities for virus exposure. Staff infrequently wore
eye protection while performing experiments with vac-
cinia. Laboratory coat sleeves were not elasticized and did
not always cover the wrist. Waste pipettes were not disin-
fected before removal from the biosafety cabinet.
Instances occurred in which samples with low titers of live
virus were removed from the biosafety cabinet, transport-
ed to other parts of the facility, and manipulated. In addi-
tion, laboratory staff routinely vortexed tubes containing
live virus outside of the biosafety cabinet. Most important,
no laboratory workers had been vaccinated in the past 10
years, as recommended by CDC (6,10).
To identify the specific infecting strain of vaccinia, the
virus isolated from the patient’s canthus lesion was
sequenced. Briefly, a 3.7-kbp amplicon was generated and
sequenced from the thymidine kinase region of the viral
genome by using the following primers: TKj2r forward 5-
ACGTG ATGGA TATAT TAAAG TCGAA and TKj2r
reverse 5-GTTTA TCTAA CGACA CAACA TCCA.
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Figure 2. Satellite lesion on lower conjunctiva. Photographer: E.
Claire Newbern.Amplification was performed with the Expand Long
Template PCR kit (Roche Molecular Biologicals,
Indianapolis, IN, USA) and a Cetus Model 9700 thermo-
cycler (Perkin-Elmer Life and Analytical Sciences,
Boston, MA, USA) at 92°C × 2 min, followed by 30 cycles
of 92°C × 10 s, 55°C × 30 s, and 68°C × 3 min. Purified,
amplified DNA was sequenced with a CEQ 8000 Genetic
Analysis System (Beckman-Coulter, Fullerton, CA, USA).
Sequences were assembled using SeqMan software
(DNASTAR, Inc., Madison, WI, USA). 
Sequencing showed that the infecting virus was a
unique form of recombinant Western Reserve vaccinia
constructed in the research laboratory and routinely used
by the patient; it had been last used as a control strain dur-
ing a multiday experiment performed in the 5 days before
the patient’s symptoms began. At one point in this experi-
ment, a 96-well plate containing small amounts of live
vaccinia–infected mammalian cells was removed from the
biosafety cabinet and hand-carried to another room, where
the lid of the plate was removed, and the cells were exam-
ined for fluorescence. The student did not wear eye protec-
tion during this phase of the experiment; whether she wore
gloves is unclear.
Conclusions
The investigation of the laboratory and examination of
clinical specimens from the patient and contacts enabled
investigators to pinpoint the source of infection to a single
experiment. During the period when the patient could have
become infected, she was the only laboratory member to
use the culprit vaccinia strain, and she used it only while
performing this particular experiment. Lack of seroconver-
sion among the other staff argues against widespread envi-
ronmental viral contamination in the laboratory. During
the time when she could have become infected, the student
had also worked with a different strain of vaccinia in titers
as high as 1:1 × 1010 PFU/mL. However, all of the work
with virus at this titer occurred in the biosafety cabinet. 
Although the exact mechanism of infection could not
be determined, the location of the principal lesion at the
inner canthus suggests either inadvertent inoculation from
hand to eye or inoculation through aerosolization of virus
(5). Regardless, both mechanisms indicate that existing
biosafety precautions in the laboratory were likely insuffi-
cient. Biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) precautions are recom-
mended for laboratories and persons who manipulate
nonattenuated strains of vaccinia virus (10). This recom-
mendation assumes a priori that all such persons will be
adequately vaccinated against the virus. However, this
report and others of laboratory-acquired vaccinia infec-
tions demonstrate that vaccination is being waived in cer-
tain institutions (1–3,11). No current recommendations
exist in the United States for the level of precautions to be
used by unvaccinated personnel. We believe that vaccina-
tion would probably have prevented or attenuated this
patient’s infection and that it should continue to be recom-
mended for laboratory workers who handle vaccinia.
However, given that vaccination has risks of its own that
might reduce its use (including a rate of ocular complica-
tions of 10–20/1 million immunizations) (5,6,12,13),
biosafety recommendations for unvaccinated personnel
should be specifically addressed. 
Chiefly intended to protect against agents with poten-
tial for respiratory transmission, BSL-3 precautions
emphasize protection from exposure to potentially infec-
tious aerosols (10). CDC has previously recommended
increased biosafety precautions for laboratories with
unvaccinated personnel who manipulate monkeypox virus
(14). Implementing certain BSL-3 precautions in this case,
e.g., performing all manipulations of virus in the biosafety
cabinet or other enclosed equipment, frequent glove
changing accompanied by handwashing, and always wear-
ing goggles or face shields when working with virus out-
side of a primary containment device, would have
minimized the potential for human error and might have
prevented this infection. Use of eye protection should be
particularly stressed, as serious eye infections can occur
even in previously vaccinated persons (15). No systematic
monitoring of vaccinia infection in laboratory workers cur-
rently exists, so the full extent of the problem is unknown.
Further investigation of laboratory practices involving
vaccinia is warranted. At the present time, vaccination is
the best way to prevent or mitigate accidental infection (4)
and should continue to be recommended for laboratory
workers handling nonattenuated strains of vaccinia. If vac-
cination is impossible, workers should implement more
stringent biosafety practices, such as consistently using
goggles and performing all manipulations of virus in the
biosafety cabinet.
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